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Abstract
We investigate patterns of vertical governance over the product life-
cycle as function of the capability regime properties imitability and sub-
stitutability. We use a novel neo-Schumpeterian model to study emerging
governance patterns. We find that, in the era of incremental change, firms
prefer vertical specialization. In the era of ferment, no governance form
dominates. Imitability and substitutability, in interplay, determine the
governance form preferred. High imitability frustrates appropriation and
thereby integration for synergistic advantages. However, firms need not
vertically specialize: under low substitutability, incompatibilities reduce
the advantages of specialization. When both substitutability and imitabil-
ity are low, firms can appropriate the value of their inventions and there
is no combinatorial advantage of specialization, so firms predominantly
integrate. If substitutability is high and imitability is low, the combina-
torial advantage of specialization balances with the synergistic advantage
of integration.
1 Introduction
Under competition, firms seek to acquire capabilities to produce products that
generate superior value for consumers. Capability value and competitiveness
of firms derive not only from own capabilities, but also from capabilities of
firms up- or downstream in the value network (cf. H˚akansson and Snehota,
∗The first author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Dutch science foun-
dation NWO, grant 458-03-112, and from the DACH research program Innovation Networks
for Regional Development partly funded by the German science foundation DFG, grant PY
70/8-1.
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1989). Given occasional changes to market, technological and competitive con-
ditions, firms are likely to have to occasionally decide on their vertical scope
of and linking with particular capabilities. Recent research is concerned with
the temporal patterns in the vertical scope of firms over the product life-cycle
(e.g. Fine, 1998; Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005;
Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; Argyres and Zenger, 2009). We use the eras of
ferment and incremental change in the cycle of technological change (Anderson
and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) to characterize the industry
conditions in product life-cycle for firms to deal with in their governance deci-
sions. Following product life-cycle theory rationales (Utterback and Abernathy,
1975), capability-based concerns tend to dominate prior to the emergence of
the dominant design, i.e. in the era of ferment, while cost-based concerns tend
to dominate in the era of incremental change. However, there is disagreement
on the vertical scope of firms during the era of ferment. According to Afuah
(2001); Jacobides and Winter (2005); Fine (1998), firms are vertically integrated
for knowledge absorption and efficient research. According to Harrigan (1985);
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986), firms are vertically specialized to prevent
lock-in and allow flexible recombination. During the era of incremental change,
firms seek to outsource production, generally to reap scope, scale and cost advan-
tages, although firms may integrate to horizontally differentiate their products
(Argyres and Bigelow, 2010).
We argue that differences in findings on the vertical governance forms chosen
may well have to do with conditions that are specific to the industry. We show
that the properties of capabilities, notably substitutability and imitability (cf.
Teece et al., 1997; Barney, 1991), determine the governance patterns over the
product life-cycle.
We analyze the relationship of the capability properties and governance
forms in a neo-Schumpeterian multi-agent model with agents that autonomously
control their vertical scope of production. There are three types of firms: in-
put component producers (suppliers), system producers (assemblers), and firms
that produce both. Firms search a capability space (Gilbert et al., 2001, 2007)
for production capabilities, and combine input and system capabilities (either
in-house or by teaming up with a firm providing the complement) to produce
products to compete on the end-consumer market. The research question is:
what patterns of vertical governance occur over the product life-cycle and how
do these patterns change with capability properties? In answering this question,
we vary the imitability and substitutability of capabilities as independent vari-
ables and study the evolutionary emerging governance pattern over the product
life-cycle as dependent variable. The cost structure (economies of scale in pro-
duction, switching costs, research costs) is the mediating variable.
We find that the vertical governance pattern over the product life-cycle
strongly depends on the basic properties of the capabilities in the technology
regime. In the era of incremental change, firms prefer vertical specialization.
In the era of ferment, however, no governance form dominates. High imitabil-
ity frustrates appropriation and thereby integration for synergistic advantages.
However, firms need not vertically specialize: under low substitutability, incom-
patibilities reduce the advantages of specialization. When both substitutability
and imitability are low, firms can appropriate the value of their inventions and
there is no combinatorial advantage of specialization, so firms predominantly
integrate. If substitutability is high and imitability is low, the combinatorial
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advantage of specialization balances with the synergistic advantage of integra-
tion. An integrated conceptual framework containing both imitability and sub-
stitutability is required to determine whether firms vertical specialize to be able
to switch to alternative component technologies or rather vertically integrate to
fine-tune input component and system.
In Section 2, we derive hypotheses from the literature on the competitive
challenges in the different eras of the technology cycle underlying the product
life-cycle and how this affects capability and cost-based governance decisions un-
der different capability regimes. In Section 3, we define our neo-Schumpeterian
agent-based simulation model. In Section 4, we present, analyze and interpret
the simulation results. In Section 5, we summarize our findings and draw con-
clusions.
2 The effect of capabilities on governance
We discuss the (dis)advantages of searching for competitive combinations of
capabilities under vertical integration and specialization, the effect of capability
properties on these search (dis)advantages in general and during the era of
ferment and incremental change in particular.
2.1 Governance form and search
The competitive value of capabilities depends on the capabilities of partners
in the value network (H˚akansson and Snehota, 1989). To realize product com-
petitiveness, up- and downstream capabilities need to be attuned. The vertical
governance form affects the search for a combination of capabilities. Firstly,
whenever a firm is vertically integrated there is a synergistic advantage at firm
level. Communication and cross-fertilization of knowledge is efficient, and in-
put component and system technology are closely finetuned during development
such that there is high internal compatibility (cf. Schilling, 2000; Kogut and Zan-
der, 1992; Afuah, 2001). An additional advantage is that integration excludes
rivals from using the same input or system and assures that the generated value
is appropriated by its (integrated) inventor. Ownership rewards the investments
in discovery (cf. Grossman and Hart, 1986).
Secondly, whenever a firm is vertically specialized, there is a combinatorial ad-
vantage at population level. An system producer can easily and (relatively)
cheaply link up with an alternative (vertically specialized) input supplier to re-
alize a new combination of capabilities (cf. Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Dyer
and Singh, 1998). In case there are many suppliers that search independently
for capabilities, system producers explore more combinations than when verti-
cally integrated. Furthermore, suppliers may trade with or be approached by
more than one assembler, thus increasing their chances of sales. Vertical spe-
cialization thus constitutes a decentralized search of many combinations.
So, vertical integration allows attuning for high performance plus appropriation
of generated value, while vertical specialization allows easy recombination and
decentralized search.
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2.2 Properties of the capability regime
Capabilities form a competitive advantage if they are valuable and rare, and
hard to imitate and substitute (Barney, 1991). In this study, we focus on im-
itability and substitutability.
Imitability refers to the extent of efforts (costs, dedicated time or other re-
sources) needed to imitate capabilities. Under high (low) imitability, limited
(extensive) efforts are required. The synergistic advantage of being integrated
reduces with imitability. If capabilities can be imitated easily and cheaply,
the competitive advantage of additional performance achieved by tight verti-
cal governance is likely to erode quickly. Furthermore, also the combinatorial
advantage of being specialized decreases as other integrated firms can quickly
imitate a high performing combination found by other firms. If imitability is
high, both advantages are relatively weak. However, by specializing, firms still
enjoy the decentralized searching and at least consider more combinations than
when fully integrated. If imitability is low, integration is an effective exclusion
and appropriation instrument (but the firm is locked in), whereas specialization
allows competitors to access the same (possibly superior) upstream capabilities.
Note that exclusion is less of a reason to integrate if those capabilities are of
limited value for competitors: the value of arbitrary complementary capabilities
drops whenever the substitutability drops. A system (input) producer does not
need to exclude competing system (input) producer from accessing the same
input (system) producer as they are likely to encounter compatibility issues
anyhow.
Substitutability refers to the extent to which swapping one capability for another
may affect overall performance (conditioned on values of both capabilities). If
input component and system capabilities are complexly interwoven or finely
attuned, swapping one for an arbitrary other capability is likely to lead to com-
patibility problems and thereby deter overall performance. If capabilities are
modular, swapping one input (system) for another input (system) capability is
likely to yield few compatibility issues. The more substitutable (more modular/
less complex) capabilities, the more eager firms are to specialize (cf. Argyres and
Bigelow, 2006; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). If substitutability is low, compat-
ibility issues are common and capabilities must be attuned closely to reach high
performance. Vertical integration allows attuning upstream and downstream
capabilities to arrive at an integrated, competitive product, while specialization
and relying on external capabilities is likely to yield products whose performance
is low due to incompatibilities. So, with a decrease in substitutability (increase
in complexity), the combinatorial advantage of specialization decreases and the
synergistic advantage of integration increases. However, due to these incompat-
ibilities, integration as exclusion instrument is less important. As the value of
decentralized search drops with a drop in substitutability, firms rely less on ver-
tical specialization and rather pursue integrated search. We expect this effect
to become stronger if imitability drops.
Table 1 contains the hypotheses. In the on-diagonal cells, there is consensus,
while, in the off-diagonal cells, there is ambiguity due to conflicting implications.
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Substitutability
Low High
Im
it
a
b
il
it
y
Low H1: Integration for exclusion/ ap-
propriation
H1: Integration for exclusion/ ap-
propriation vs. specialization to link
w. top capabilities
H2: Integration for attuning, spe-
cialization suffers incompatibilities
H2: Specialization for decentralized
search
High H1: Specialization for decentralized
search
H1&2: Specialization for decentral-
ized search
H2: Integration for attuning, spe-
cialization suffers incompatibilities
Table 1: Governance forms as predicted by imitability and substitutability.
There is ambiguity on the governance form in the off-diagonal cells. In the era
of incremental change,
2.3 Governance in different eras
Recent research is concerned with the temporal patterns in the vertical scope of
firms over the product life-cycle (e.g. Fine, 1998; Jacobides and Winter, 2005;
Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; Argyres and Zenger,
2009). According to the cycle of technological change (Anderson and Tushman,
1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), the industry cycles through the eras of
ferment and incremental change, punctuated by the emerge of a dominant de-
sign and a radical breakthrough. In each of these eras, the market, competitive
and technological conditions differ, and so are the concerns in deciding on a
governance form. Table 1 needs further specification for both eras.
During the era of ferment, entrants and incumbents compete on product tech-
nology and small scale production has firms produce in costly job shops. Firms
are faced with a -what we call- ’high stakes/ high gains’ governance dilemma. In-
tegration allows firms to attune input and system and reach a high performance.
However, firms also frequently discover new input and system technologies and
frequently bring new products to the market. With this technological turmoil,
there is a high risk that current capabilities become obsolete and the value of
being able to link up with complementing capabilities increases (cf. Harrigan,
1985; Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986). If substitutability is high, flexible
recombination is relatively valuable. If substitutability is low, the probability
that a complement at the market yields a high performing product is low. Under
low imitability, firms can effectively appropriate market value, so integration to
reach a high performance is more valuable. The propensity to vertically inte-
grate decreases with imitability.
During the era of incremental change, technological changes are unlikely or less
frequent. Specialization to be able to link to alternative capabilities is only occa-
sionally interesting. However, firms are manufacturing a relatively standardized
product with relatively stationary demand, so it is probably easy to find a
supplier of standard inputs or an assembler of standard systems. Governance
decisions are primarily cost-based and target minimizing the production and
transaction costs. Firms outsource production if there are positive economies
of scale in production in an upstream sector (cf. Stigler, 1951), or if there are
diseconomies of scope (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) (or positive economies of spe-
cialization (cf. Smith, 2003)). In general, transaction costs and diseconomies of
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scope mediate the appeal of specialization and integration in obvious directions:
e.g. existence of positive economies of scale in the upstream sector promotes
vertical specialization. We expect that these factors have greater explanatory
power during the era of incremental change. In the present chapter, we treat
transaction and production costs as mediating variables. The governance form
affects (potential) scale economies, scope economies, marginalization, dexterity,
and transaction costs. We discuss actual assumptions in the model definition.
3 Neo-Schumpeterian model
3.1 Overview
We provide a neo-Schumpeterian model in which firms compete for consumer
demand through product innovation and price setting. The industry has a
fixed, two-tier vertical structure and firms explicitly decide to produce systems,
input components, or both. A system producer needs to buy inputs, while an
integrated firm makes both inputs and systems. Figure 1 illustrates the industry
structure.
Consumers
System
assemblers
Input
producers
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the industry structure. Here, one supplier
provides inputs to two system assemblers, and there is one integrated firm.
In Subsection 3.2, we describe how firms search a multidimensional capabil-
ity landscape for superior capabilities and how vertically specialized firms also
look for production chain partners with superior capabilities to jointly produce
a superior product. In Subsection 3.3, we describe the firm heuristics for its
business strategy (mass manufacturer or entrepreneur), a product technology
search strategy (exploration, imitation or radical search) and a vertical gover-
nance strategy (vertically integrate or specialize) of firms. Given that searching,
producing and changing production costs money, only firms that have superior
products survive and see their strategies imitated by entrants. This establishes
an evolutionary ’training’ of the strategy. The products are launched, dynami-
cally priced and ultimately withdrawn from the market following the heuristics
described in Subsection 3.4. In Subsection 3.5, we describe how consumers buy
6
Simulation of industry evolution
for X periods.
Simulation step in which agents
1. Determine governance/ business/ search strategy
2. Search landscape and update capability repository
3. Look for new product propositions and possibly update
product portfolio
4. Change prices based on market poll
5. Sell products (consumers buy products)
6. Evaluate capital position and possibly exit
Initialize population of A firms with all logical
combinations for governance strategy.
Construct strategy for potential
entrant from strategy of incumbent
with highest cumulative capital
Would
potential
entrant enter?
Initialize new agent
with that strategy and
add it to existing
population
Yes
No
Increase period
counter
Last period?No
Yes
Log industry evolution data.
Log governance strategy of firm
with highest cumulative strategy
Figure 2: Flowchart of industry evolution with strategy training.
products based on price, performance, their adoption willingness and recom-
mendations by other consumers. A flowchart of this industry evolution with
strategy training is given in Figure 2.
In the present work, we train only two strategy variables: the governance form
(integrated/ specialized) before and after the emergence of the dominance de-
sign. The strategy variables for business type (mass-production versus job shop
production) and capability search are fixed. The industry level parameters (pro-
duction costs, diffusion rate, etc) are treated as mediating variables. The other
strategy decision variables (decision thresholds discussed later) are taken con-
stant and equal for all agents. By homogenizing firms, evolution trains just the
governance strategy. The values chosen for mediating variables and strategy
decisions variables are given in Appendix 6. In Subsection 4.1, we discuss our
parameter choices in detail. Typical simulation results (see Subsection 4) of our
neo-Schumpeterian model feature distinct eras of ferment and of incremental
change and reproduces the stylized facts of swarm-in/ shake-out, turbulence/
convergence in product technology, and profit erosion.
3.2 Capability search
Firms search at two levels: operational landscape search and combinatorial
search. At the first level, firms search the capability landscapes (the system
production capability landscape, the input production capability landscape, or
both) for new viable capabilities by manipulating an experimental capability
proposition. As soon as a focal firm finds a capability with non-zero performance
that is new to this firm, the firm adds it to its internal capability repository.
At the second level, firms form product propositions from combinations of read-
ily discovered input and system capabilities. An integrated firm combines sys-
tem and input capabilities from its internal capability repositories, while an
assembler combines its internal system capabilities with input capabilities pos-
sessed by suppliers. Whenever an integrated firm or potential value chain part-
ner adds a capability to its repository, all possible new combinations are in-
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capability dimensions
Input production
capability dimensions
Product
proposition
Ability
skill
technique
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of the two capability dimension landscapes
consisting of ’reels’ of abilities/ skills/ techniques.
spected for new and better performing products.
Radical search unlocks a new generation of product capabilities. Once a firm
has unlocked a generation new to it, it will focus its search on that generation.
A capability of a particular generation needs a complementary capability of the
same generation.
Firms do not just explore the current landscape, or unlock new ones through
radical search, but may also imitate product technology of competitors. In
Subsection 3.3, we describe how firms decide what search strategy to follow.
Landscape search
A capability is the recipe on how to mix techniques, capital goods, and skills/
abilities to produce a certain output product. We operationally encode a ca-
pability as an alphabetic string. There are two capability landscape tiers: one
for system capabilities and one for input capabilities. Each capability landscape
tier is made up of a fixed number of N capability dimensions (abilities, tech-
niques, capital goods, skills). For each of the capability dimensions, there are
D options. We use the metaphor of the reels in a gambling slot machine (see
Figure 3): there are N reels (capability dimensions) with D pictures (skills/
abilities/ techniques/ resources). At each tier, the firm is looking for a feasible
combination in the space of size DN possible combinations.
As R&D is done by trial-and-error (Nelson and Winter, 1982), we infer that
almost all capabilities (each a unique combination of abilities, techniques, skills,
etc) are technological infeasible and have zero performance. Only a few capabil-
ities have non-zero performance. From innovation size distribution studies (e.g.
Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003), we infer that combinations that are feasible
have a certain performance distribution. We implement these two observations
as in the island-sea landscape of Fagiolo and Dosi (2003): opportunities are ran-
domly scattered ’islands’ in a ’sea’ that has to be sailed to reach those islands.
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Landscape search
Manipulate one random
capability reel (one ability/skill/
technology) in the experimental
capability proposition
Performance of
experimental
capability
== 0
Add to capability
repository for later
consideration
>0
Figure 4: Flowchart of operational landscape search in which the experimental
capability is manipulated to find new feasible capabilities by trial-and-error.
During initialization of the industry, we randomly select C combinations that
are feasible (so we have C islands) and have a non-zero performance, and set
the remaining DN − C capabilities to have a performance of zero1.
Of the C feasible capabilities, capability i from product technology generation
g has a performance q equal to g + e−αu
β
∈ [g, g + 1] where u ∼ U [0, 1] is a
uniform random variable. We tune this distribution with parameters α ≥ 0
and β ≥ 0 to assure that a large share of the capabilities has low performance,
while a small share of the capabilities has high performance (cf. Silverberg and
Verspagen, 2003).
During exploration, the focal firm searches this landscape by changing one abil-
ity at a time of its experimental capability proposition, i.e. by turning one
capability reel in Figure 3 up or down one step at a time. If a capability is
technologically feasible, i.e. has a performance higher than zero, it is added to
the capability repository and is considered during the first level combinatorial
search (which is described in detail below). The process of operational land-
scape search is depicted in the flowchart in Figure 4. We assume that firms have
fixed search costs.
Combinatorial search
Whenever an integrated firm finds a capability that is new to this firm, it is
added to its repository. The focal firm then considers all combinations of this
new capability with the complementary component capabilities (of the same
generation) it currently possesses. Whenever an assembler discovers a new sys-
tem capability or a supplier discovers a new input capability, the assembler
will consider all new combinations with capabilities of suppliers by enumera-
tive search. Whenever a supplier discovers a new capability, assemblers contact
the supplier to evaluate new combinations. This procedure is depicted in the
flowchart in Figure 5. We discuss the procedure to decide on whether to start
the production of a new product in Subsection 3.4.
We assume that already one poorly performing capability will cause the
whole product to be poorly performing. The performance of a combination of
1At first, we drew a performance value for each of the DN combinations. We found
that the capabilities with very low performance were used only very rarely and usually only
very briefly (until replaced by capabilities with higher performance). So, the effect of the
capabilities with very low performance was limited. Truncating the very low performance
values of the DN − C capabilities to zero, and thereby adopting the island-sea landscape,
we shortened the computation time dramatically. Switching to an island-sea structure of the
capability landscape goes at the expense of having to add an additional parameter C for the
number of islands.
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Combinatorial
product search
Firm type
Discovered
new assembly
capability
Supplier has
discovered new
component
capability
no
assembler
no
supplier
Find new feasible combinations of
own assembly capabilities with
component capabilities offered by
suppliers
yes
yes
Discovered
new assembly
or component
capability
integrated
Find new feasible
combinations of internal
assembly and component
capabilities
no
yes
Consider all new
combinations
(=products) for
production
Figure 5: Flowchart of combinatorial search for products by combining capabil-
ities already discovered.
system and input capability is low if one or both capabilities have low perfor-
mance. The performance of a combination is high only if the performances of
both the input and system capabilities are high. If either one is low, the overall
performance is low. To operationalize this interaction, we take the product of
the performances. As also the fit of input and system matters, we multiply
this product by the compatibility value (explained in detail later). The skewed
nature of the total performance due to the multiplications is corrected by tak-
ing the third root. We thus propose the following expression for the overall
performance q of a product:
q = g + 3
√
(qSi − g)(q
I
j − g)cij (1)
Hereby, qSi (q
I
j ) is the performance of the system i (input j), g is the genera-
tion of both input and system (which is described later when discussing radical
search), cij is the compatibility j and system i.
Following the landscape metaphor for capabilities, the compatibility cij of the
input and the system relates inversely to the ’distance’ δij in the codings of the
input and system. We use the Lee (1958) measure L, which is the minimum
number of one-step manipulations required to change one coding into another.
We assume that compatibility drops with distance and that the relative mag-
nitude of the drop is a negative constant. As such, the compatibility is an
exponential function:
cij = e
−x δij with δij :=
2L(si,sj)
ND
(2)
The si (sj) is the (alphabetic) string for system i (input j). The distance δij is
normalized by using that ND/2 is the maximum Lee distance. Complexity x
determines the level of substitutability of inputs (and systems) for one another
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in a given product. If x = 0, the inputs are perfectly interchangeable (as are the
systems), as there is no effect on the overall product performance by doing so.
The higher x > 0 is, the more sensitive overall product performance becomes
to the compatibility (distance) of input and system. We use this complexity x
as if the inverse of substitutability and treat it as one of our two independent
variables.
Effect of the governance form on search
From the perspective of capability search, both governance forms (vertically in-
tegrated, specialized) have their advantages. A vertically specialized assembler
has the advantage of being able to combine with all input capabilities offered
by -potentially many- suppliers. As all of these suppliers are searching for and
also finding input capabilities, the number of capabilities on offer also quickly
grows. This is the combinatorial advantage as discussed in Subsection 2.2.
A vertically integrated firm has the advantage of having control over looking
for input and system capabilities that are a proper fit. We model such a syner-
gistic advantage by having an integrated firm look for inputs on the capability
landscape tier in the alphabetic neighborhood of the system capability. The
second advantage is that the integrated firm does not need to rely on suppliers
that may go bankrupt after which the assembler has to switch to using possibly
less compatible inputs. From the compatibility formula (2), it is apparent that
the ’synergistic advantages’ of integrated search are particularly great whenever
substitutability is low (complexity x is high).
Multiple generations of product technology
Given economic conditions specified later, firms engage in radical search to
unlock a new landscape for the next generation of products. As consumers are
willing to pay more for the new generation of products, there is a potential
reward for firms to engage in radical search. The performance of an input or
system of generation g lies in the range [g, g + 1]. So, in Equation (1), we used
the normalized performance level of input and system in computing the overall
performance.
3.3 Strategies
Each firm follows three strategies: a business strategy, a capability landscape
search strategy and a vertical governance strategy. Following Anderson and
Tushman (1990), we have firms change their business strategy upon the techno-
logical punctuations. In line with this, we also have firms change their vertical
governance strategy upon technological punctuations. In our model, we thus
have firms all respond to industry-level events rather than follow individual
strategies.
The business strategy, capability landscape search target and the vertical gover-
nance are only reconsidered whenever the firm is engaged in exploration. When-
ever the firm is engaged in imitation, differentiation or radical search, the firm
first finishes that search operation. We now describe these three strategies in
detail.
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Determine search
strategy
Have component/
products for this
industry
Industry is young,
without competing
component/
product?
EXPLOREYESNO
Firm determines search strategy based
on conditions in the industry of the
generation in which it is currently active
Performance top
component/
product is
sufficiently more
attractive
IMITATE top
component/
product
YES
YES
NO
LAGGARD
NO
Potential profit
is negative
Avg profit too
low and design
dominant
NO
RADICAL
SEARCH
YES
YES
YES
Difference in performance of top
component/ product and performance of
own component/ product exceeds a
threshold defined in search strategy
Firm is laggard if it targets a potential
market (total nr of consumers that have not
yet consumed a component/ product of
newer generation) that is smaller than the
potential market of the top component/
product.
Potential profit is a rough estimate:
Willingness-to-pay / value-for-money –
sum of production costs.
Average profit below and design
dominance above thresholds defined in
search strategy.
NO
EXPLORE
NO
Figure 6: The search strategy determines when to explore freely, imitate the
top product/ component/ assembly or to engage in radical research to unlock
the next generation of capabilities.
Capability landscape search strategy
In Subsection 3.2, we described the operational search processes that yield capa-
bilities by trial-and-error, exploratory search. Apart from exploring its current
capability landscape for new capabilities, a focal firm may decide to imitate
(through directed search) the capabilities used for a product currently on the
market, to differentiate2 away from its current capability experiment, or to en-
gage in radical search to unlock a new generation capability landscape with
higher performance. The landscape search strategy determines when the focal
firm should engage in exploration, imitation and radical search.
The first consideration in what search heuristic to follow is that the firm
(here: system assembler or integrated firm) continues exploration if the indus-
try is premature, i.e. whenever there is no competing product or the performance
of the best product is low. We assume that -in real-life- firms continue searching
in a premature industry because they still try to realize a large market share in
this industry by providing a top performing product in time. Otherwise, if there
is a top performing competing product and the performance of that product is
2In the present version, we have disabled differentiation as it is not substantially different
from regular exploration: random walks (our exploration) in spaces of dimension higher than
two are not recurrent in expectation. So, exploration is already a move away from the current
capability experiment.
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sufficiently higher, the firm starts imitating that product. A supplier follows
the same rationale but then for the input capability. This ’sufficiently higher’
relative performance for imitation is a threshold parameter in the search strat-
egy. In case the firm is an entrepreneur (manufacturer), and if the performance
of another product is ≥ 5% (≥ 15%, which is higher because of higher switching
costs) higher than his own product, the entrepreneur (manufacturer) will start
to imitate that other product.
Imitation is operationally defined as manipulating the experimental combination
of capability dimensions (abilities, skills, techniques, equipment) to decrease the
distance from the experimental to the target capability. The probability of a
successful step in the direction of the system/ input capability is i, where i is
the imitability rate. The imitability i is, just as complexity x, an independent
variable in this chapter. Consequently, given that the starting point on the land-
scape and the capability to be imitated are uncorrelated, the expected number
of periods required to imitate the capability is N4i
(
D − 1D odd
1
D
)
. The higher we
set imitability i, the lower is the expected number of periods needed to imitate
the target capability.
If the industry is not premature but the competing product is not good enough
for imitation, the firm (here: assembler, supplier or integrated firm) considers
radical search. The firm will engage in radical search if one of three conditions
holds. Firstly, if the firm is a ’laggard’, which we operationally define as that the
firm is not yet active in a new generation product technology while more than
half of the consumers is already buying products of a new(er) generation. Sec-
ondly, the profitability of the current top performing product of the generation
produced by the focal firm is negative. Thirdly, the smoothened profit margin
is lower than a particular threshold (we picked 0.05, i.e. if the profit margin
drops below 5%), while the smoothened design dominance is higher than a par-
ticular threshold (we picked 0.80, i.e. one product technology is consumed by
more than 80% of the demand market already). The design considerations for
this third option are that if a certain technology is already dominant and the
profit is low, there are insufficient opportunities in this industry. In that case,
a firm will rather try to open up a new industry with more opportunities. If
these conditions do not hold (so there are enough opportunities, there still is a
sufficiently high profit margin and the own performance is relatively high), then
the firm continues local exploration.
The procedure that firms follow to determine their search strategy is depicted
in the flowchart in Figure 6.
Business strategy
We distinguish two types of agents: entrepreneurs and mass-manufacturers. An
entrepreneur is focused on technological exploration and runs a job shop with
versatile production facilities. Production switching is relatively cheap, but unit
fixed production costs are high. A mass-manufacturer is focused on large scale
production and runs a dedicated mass-production facility. Production switching
is expensive, but unit fixed production costs are low.
Firms switch between entrepreneurial flexibility and mass-production based on
design dominance Hˆ (defined in Subsubsection 3.6). If Hˆ is below a threshold
H0 −m, firms become entrepreneurs, if Hˆ exceeds H0 +m, firms become man-
ufacturers. As Hˆ may be volatile, there may be repeated crossing of H0 despite
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a structural drift towards 1 or a steep drop due to technological turmoil. Given
the high costs of changing the business form, we introduce a region of hysteresis
[H0 − m,H0 + m] to prevent repeated changes purely due to volatility rather
than structural changes.
We assume that firms are entrepreneurial in the era of ferment of a new genera-
tion and (at the same time) mass-producing in the era of incremental search in
the old generation. As soon as the new generation of products is phased-in in
mass-production, the old generation of products -if still produced- is discontin-
ued. As soon as a firm engages in exploration in a new generation of capabilities,
the firm will pick the governance form that is beneficial for the entrepreneurial
activities.
Vertical governance strategy
Whenever a firm is engaged in regular exploratory search (so, not when imi-
tating or engaged in radical search), the firm changes its vertical governance
according to the following simple heuristics. If an assembler does not find a
supplier, or a supplier does not find an assembler, it will vertically integrate. In
any other case, the firm picks the governance form related to the era. In the
era of ferment, i.e. prior to the emergence of the dominant design, the focal firm
picks the governance form for that era. Similarly, after the emergence of the
dominant design, the focal firm picks the governance form for the era of incre-
mental change, which may well be different from that for the era of ferment.
These two governance form specifications are the only two variables that are
endogenously trained.
Whenever an integrated firm becomes an assembler, this assembler links up
with an existing supplier if this supplier provides the currently used or even a
better input, but otherwise spins off its input production capabilities to a newly
established supplier with whom it then links. Similarly, whenever an integrated
firm becomes a supplier and does not find an assembler that switches to it, this
firm spins off its system production facilities to a newly established assembler
with whom it then links. From that moment onward both specialized firms fol-
low their own (autonomous) heuristics that further improve their performance.
The outsourcing agent considers switching to another supplier already the next
period.
Upon integration, the firm acquires the complementary capabilities of its cur-
rent value-chain partner(s) and continues to produce the products, but now fully
in-house.
The costs of integration and outsourcing are discussed in Subsection 3.7.
3.4 Product launch, pricing, and withdrawal
Each assembler or vertically integrated firm has a portfolio of product proposi-
tions that it actually produces and sells on the market. If search yields a new
product proposition, the firm evaluates whether it is eligible for production and,
if so, adds it to the product portfolio. A product proposition is eligible for pro-
duction if it outperforms one of the currently produced products or there is still
room in the otherwise limited product portfolio. Moreover, the product must
have positive potential profit margin. The flowchart for this procedure is found
in Figure 7.
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Start production of
product?
Product
already in
portfolio?
Maximum number
of products in
portfolio reached?
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exceeds worst
performing product in
portfolio?
no
no
yes
no
yes
Potential
profitability
estimated
Add product to portfolio
(possibly replacing product
with worst performance)
and start production
>0
<=0
yes
Figure 7: The flowchart for deciding on whether or not to start producing a
particular product.
If a firm has not yet produced and sold a particular product before, it has
to start up production (for which a fixed cost is incurred) and launch it by
giving a promotional unit to a number of consumers. These consumers will thus
(possibly) drive further diffusion-substitution.
A selling firm (i.e. fully integrated or assembler) withdraws a product from the
market and removes it from its portfolio if there has been no sales in the current
period and there are no potential future sales. Note that also sales by any of
the competitors of the same product or consumers currently still consuming the
product forms potential future sales.
Firms set the price upon the product launch such that the value-for-money of
the product (performance divided by price) is equal to the average value-for-
money of products currently on the market. The rationale is that overpricing
will stifle diffusion, while dramatic underpricing would hurt revenue too much.
In case it is the first product on the market, the maximum willingness-to-pay
price p∗ is set.
Each period, each firm conducts a poll for each of its products to determine
whether to change the price or not. In this poll, the firm randomly draws a
fixed number B of consumers from the population of consumers that currently
consumes any product of the same product generation. The firm then asks
each consumer the probability that it would buy the product in case of three
scenarios: the price remains the same, is increased a little, and is decreased a
little. These probabilities are in fact determined by the discrete choice model
discussed later. The firm then maximizes expected sales (average probability
times the (new) price) by increasing, decreasing or keeping the current price.
Figure 8 contains the flowchart of this process.
Product pricing by
market poll
Randomly draw B
consumers from
market for poll.
Ask each consumer the
probability that he would buy
the product if it would be:
A. cheaper (p – d)
B. more expensive (p + d)
C. same price (p)
Compute total
expected sales for
these 3 scenarios
Set price p to the
price that yields
the highest
expected sales
Figure 8: The flowchart for product pricing process by polling consumers.
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Reset w to (random) new
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Figure 9: The flowchart for the procedure how a focal consumer decides when
to purchase what product of which generation.
With multiple firms and sufficiently discriminative consumers, there is profit
erosion and eventually even a (marginal) loss to be expected. Firms will end up
losing money, go bankrupt and exit. As demand is inelastic, a remaining monop-
olist can increase its price indefinitely. As such, we assume that a monopolist
will not exit the industry. As we will see in Subsection 3.6, the monopolist will
eventually have a high profit margin, which in turn attracts one or multiple
entrants that will restore regular price competition.
3.5 Consumption, demand, and diffusion-substitution
Generally, consumers face numerous products to choose from, often even prod-
ucts from multiple product technology generations. We borrow two criteria from
diffusion theory (Rogers, 1995) on how a consumer selects a product: firstly, a
certain reluctance to buy new products and, secondly, that peers affect a con-
sumer in its product choice. Particularly the gradual adoption of products of a
new generation makes that competing products that are introduced later still
have a chance of growing a (temporary) sizable market share. As such, there is
an era of ferment in which many product variants have a limited market share.
However, in the end, the word-of-mouth (and imitation) causes emergence of
a dominant design after which industry finds itself in the era of incremental
change. Figure 9 contains the flowchart of how a focal consumer decides when
to purchase what product of which generation. The mechanisms and variables
in this flowchart are explained in the following subsections.
Adoption willingness
Consumers consume or wear out their products at a constant rate r. Whenever
the amount w left of its currently consumed unit of product hits or drops below
zero (the product is finished or worn out), the consumer seeks to buy a new
unit of product. Upon purchasing a new unit of product, a consumer gets an
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amount w0 of unit product left. This w0 is drawn randomly from {1 − rρ, 1 −
r(ρ − 1), . . . , 1, . . . , 1 + rρ}. This ρ ≥ 0 defines that there are 2ρ + 1 different
usage scenarios to account for different levels of consumption, wear and tear,
accidents and dissatisfaction (and to smoothen out otherwise recurring ’spikes’
in demand caused by product launches). The development of the ’amount’ of
product left is illustrated in Figure 10.
Each consumer i has a certain ’Rogerian adoption willingness’ Ri in adopt-
ing new product technology. This is a property of the consumer that does not
change. Once products of a new generation are brought to the market, con-
sumers (again) display ’first-buy’ adoption willingness for this new generation.
This Ri is drawn
3 from N (µ, σ) with µ = 3σ. For Ri close to zero, consumer
i is an ’early adopter’, for Ri close to µ+ 3σ, the consumer is a ’late adopter’.
An illustrative histogram of the number of consumers with a certain adoption
willingness R for the first-buy of a new generation of product technology is given
in Figure 11.
Once a new generation g of products is launched at time Tg, each consumer’s
’adoption willingness’ counter for that generation starts to count down from
Rig(Tg) = Ri to zero at rate r per period
4. So, consumer i is willing to buy a
product of the generation g launched at time Tg as of time t = Tg +Ri/r.
Once a consumer has finished its current unit of product (possibly of an old gen-
eration g′), and the consumer has to buy a new unit of product, the consumer
purchases a product of the newest generation he is willing to adopt (i.e. the
highest generation g with a non-positive Rig). If a product of that generation is
not available, the consumer will not buy an old generation, but will try to buy
a product of this generation next period. Under the assumption of availability
of products of yet discovered generations (which is assured due to our entry
criteria), all first-buyers have purchased their first unit of product of generation
g in approximately 6σ/r periods after the launch.
Word-of-mouth
Each consumer that purchases a product of generation g compiles a panel of Q
randomly selected consumers that are currently consuming a product of gener-
ation g and whose product is still on offer on the market. The consumer favors
the product recommended by panel member i according to the following discrete
choice probability (cf. Anderson et al., 1992):
pi =
eγvi∑Q
j=1 e
γvj
Where vj is the value-for-money of the product of panel member j at the time
of purchase and γ is the ’choosiness’ of consumers for the value-for-money.
3In diffusion theory, the social network structure and potential adopter characteristics
cause a Normally distributed first-buy adoption pattern. In the present work, we impose a
Normally distributed period until the first-buy and a uniform random social neighborhood for
the first-buyer at the moment of product selection (as described later). This gives rise to the
Rogerian curve without having to specify the social network structure and particularities of
consumers.
4We scale R such that we can use deterioration/ usage rate r for the rate at which a
consumer is increasing its adoption willingness for this.
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Figure 11: An illustrative histogram
of the number of consumers with a
certain Rogerian adoption willingness
R.
The value-for-money of a product is defined as:
v =
q
q∗p
The value-for-money is in essence how much value (performance q) the con-
sumer gets per dollar (price p). We normalize the value to q/q∗, with q∗ the
highest performance yet found, to make the payoff independent of the absolute
performances.
A firm launches a product by providing a fixed number of random consumers
with a free unit and thereby resetting these consumers’ product-amount-left w
as if this is a regular purchase. As these consumers will thus become part of the
panels consulted by buyers, new demand for the product might be generated,
and the product potentially diffuses.
Our implementation assures there is regular diffusion, as well as intra- and
inter-generational substitution.
3.6 Entry and exit
Upon the initialization of the first run of an industry, there is a fixed number
of firms that immediately enter. To prevent favoring a particular strategy, we
initialize A firms with all A combinations of integration and outsourcing before
and after the emergence of the dominant design. From that moment onward,
firms enter and exit the industry fully endogenously. A firm exits the industry
if its capital drops below the bankruptcy level (zero). However, we assume that
a monopolist succeeds in persuading creditors not to file for bankruptcy. Given
the inelasticity of demand, the pricing mechanism has the monopolist raise its
prices. Once a new firm enters the industry, and the industry no longer is a
monopoly, the old exit conditions are restored.
Following Nelson and Winter (1982), we assume that there is always a firm
on the sideline, waiting for the industry conditions to meet its entry criteria
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to then enter. Each period, the potential entrant (imperfectly) imitates the
strategy of the firm with the highest (discounted) cumulative capital. Upon
imitation, the potential entrant changes the governance strategy in 5% of the
cases. This constitutes local search in the governance strategy. Following this
strategy, the potential entrant determines whether it becomes entrepreneur or
manufacturer and whether it would then enter or not.
We assume that an entrepreneur is eager to enter when profit margins for the
latest generation of products are high while the product design dominance in
that generation is low. In that case, there are considerable market and techno-
logical opportunities. The entry rate e of entrepreneurs is e(x) = 1/x, with x the
present number of firms. We assume that a manufacturer enters when the profit
margin (for the latest generation of products) is not too low while the design
dominance in that generation is already relatively high. In this case, the man-
ufacturer can cover investments while it is unlikely that a switch in production
is required. The conditional entry rate e for manufacturers is e(x) = a/(1 + x)
with 0 < a < 1 to reflect that manufacturers are crowd-avoiding.
The entry criteria revolve around the profit margin and design dominance.
For the design dominance statistic, we use the following concentration index for
generation g:
H2g =
∑
i∈Mg
s2i
S2
(3)
where the si with i ∈Mg are the market shares of products of generation g on
the market (possibly marketed by more than one firm), Mg is the index set of
products of generation g on the market, and S is a normalization constant (over
all generations).
We compute this H for each generation g of products on the market. We do
not pick S2 = (
∑
i si)
2. In our case, si need not sum up to 1 as there may be
potential adopters that still need to do their first-buy. As we use H to reflect
market opportunities, we rather take S = rN , where rN is the average demand
per period (in number of consumers) with all repeat-buyers. Due to first-buys
and future peaks in sales due to launches, the H may be temporarily higher
than 1. Given the volatility of si, particularly in the onset phase, we have firms
use an exponentially smoothened Hˆ ← hH + (1− h)Hˆ with smoothing rate h.
For the profit margin per generation, we use the weighted average of the profit
margins of all products of that generation. We again have firms use an exponen-
tially smoothened average profit margin as there is volatility due to introduction
and withdrawal of products.
3.7 Cost structure
We control the cost structure as a mediating variable. We pick a cost struc-
ture that closely meets the classical product life-cycle notions of entrepreneurial
activities before and mass-manufacturing activities after the emergence of the
dominant design. We assume that an entrepreneur runs a job shop, which is
flexible and allows switching to producing another product at low costs. How-
ever, a job shop is less efficient than a dedicated production line, such that there
are high unit production costs. In contrast, a manufacturer has high production
switching costs, but is more efficient and has low unit production costs.
The actual vertical governance form affects the immediate production costs
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through the transaction costs that exist to contact, contract and control the
supplier as opposed to production in-house. Changing the governance form also
goes at certain expenses. Integration requires investments in production facili-
ties, while these facilities are scrapped upon outsourcing.
We assume that there are no explicit search costs (i.e. for imitation, exploration
or radical search), just periodic operation costs.
The actual values used in the standard simulation runs are provided in Appendix
6.
4 Results
In this section, we present, analyze and interpret the simulation results. In
Subsection 4.1, we show that our model reproduces the stylized facts of a product
life-cycle. In Subsection 4.2, we present experimental results on how imitability
and complexity (substitutability) affect the evolutionary emerging governance
forms in the era of ferment and the era of incremental change. We statistically
analyze and conceptually interpret the simulation results, and compare them
with our theoretical predictions.
4.1 Analysis of the simulated industry evolution
In this subsection, we cross-validate the simulation results with common styl-
ized facts in evolutionary economics for industry evolution under homogeneous
demand. We start off with a discussion of the parameter values chosen. We
then establish that our simulation model of the product life-cycle indeed pro-
duces results that features consecutive product life-cycles with eras of ferment
and incremental change with the common stylized facts. We then discuss the
effect of our parameter choices on the stylized life-cycles.
Parameter settings
The parameter values for the costs structure, technology landscape, demand
and pricing modules, and strategy parameters have been attuned to each other
to assure that the simulation results feature the stylized facts. In this pa-
rameter fine-tuning, we had to balance the ratio of feasible capabilities (tuned
by the landscape parameters), the periodic operation costs, and possible rev-
enue (as tuned by number of customers, maximum willingness-to-pay, diffusion-
substitution rate, and price adjustment rate). This can be conceptually ex-
plained by the fact that if firms have to search longer, the costs are higher,
such that the total revenue must be higher to assure that at least some firms
succeed in recovering the search costs. In fact, during experimentation with
the market and pricing modules determining the revenue, and the technology
landscape module determining the average search trajectory length, we noticed
that the parameter settings seem to be relative rather than requiring a par-
ticular absolute setting. Ultimately, we aimed for parameter values that have
an ’economically sensible interpretation’, but also targeted a reasonable com-
puter processing time. To this end, we have limited the market size to 4000
consumer agents. More consumers would slow down simulating the industry
tremendously. Using this market size, we then picked the willingness to pay,
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search costs, and initial capital endowments. Given the development of capital,
we tuned the fraction of feasible capabilities in the landscape search module,
with the scale and tail of the performance levels to agree with empirical findings.
After selecting the value for these parameters, there are only a few parame-
ters left to specify.
The smoothing rates that we use to calculate macro-economic variables like de-
sign dominance and average profit margin make these macro-economic variables
less volatile for period-to-period changes. As design dominance and average
profit margin are used by firms to determine their strategies, higher volatility of
these variables may cause firms to execute certain actions rather erratically, e.g.
upon early incidental crossings of decision thresholds or even repeatedly. So,
we used these parameters indeed to smoothen out macro-economic variables,
thereby make the product life-cycle somewhat less erratic, but without chang-
ing the simulation results structurally.
Ideally, all strategy parameters and thresholds described in Subsection 3.3
would be learned by the firms over the course of the industry evolution. How-
ever, our focus is on the governance strategy, such that we want to reduce the
interference of other strategy parameters; a firm with an otherwise superior gov-
ernance strategy may perform inferiorly due to unfavorable settings for other
strategy parameters. After experimentation, we decided to increase the discrim-
inative power of evolution on the governance strategy by removing such ’noise’
of other strategy parameters on performance. So, in the present study, we fixed
all strategy parameters but those related to vertical governance.
Clearly, when fixing the strategy parameters for the search strategy (imitation,
exploration, radical search), adoption of newly found products, and entry, it is
of great importance that we pick values with an ’economically sensible inter-
pretation’. With regard to imitation, our idea is that firms will only engage
in the -possibly lengthy- imitation process if the performance is more than y%
better than the firms currently own top product. As imitation will inevitably
mean that this product is also taken into production, and production switching
is argued to be more costly for manufacturers, the improvement for manufac-
tures must be even greater than for entrepreneurs. Something similar holds for
discovered products in recombination of capabilities: if the product is not more
than z% better than the top product, the firm will not take it into production
because consumers have only a small probability of buying it.
In our operational definition of entry and parameter choices, we have assured
that firms will not enter if the profit margin is too low or if the design dominance
is too high. Even if a firm succeeds in finding a top product that consumers
switch to, the expenses may not be recovered before other firms find a radical
breakthrough. In our operational definition of radical search and parameter
choices, we have assured that firms will start radical search if the profit margin
is very low and the design dominance is very high. After all, there are then only
limited opportunities to make a profit in this generation of product technology.
In our operational definition of the business strategy and parameter choices, we
have assured that firms will not switch to mass-manufacturing facilities when-
ever they are expected to have to switch production due to technological turmoil.
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Stylized facts reproduced
The simulation results are externally valid in that -for our choice of parameters
(see Appendix 6)- our model robustly produces distinct eras of ferment and
incremental change and robustly produces the stylized facts of the product life-
cycle for homogeneous demand of swarm-in/ shake-out of firms, the pattern of
turmoil and convergence in technology, and profit erosion.
For the illustration, we initialize our application to simulate an industry evo-
lution for X = 10000 periods. We set the independent variables imitability
i = 0.025 and complexity x = 4.0, and -anticipating results discussed later-
preset the governance strategy to integration in the era of ferment and vertical
specialization in the era of incremental change. The simulation results are plot-
ted in Figure 12. The vertical bars (here at about periods 3750 and 7250) in
all subfigures signify radical innovation punctuations at which an era of ferment
starts. The era of incremental change is associated with a high level of concen-
tration/ dominance of particular product technology. Figure 12c contains square
curves (different colors only for clarity) for the life-spans and performances of
the various products on the market. During the intervals of roughly [0, 2000]
and [3750, 5000] there are many product introductions and removals, and the
performance levels of these products varies much but tends to increase. During
the intervals [2000, 3750] and [5000, 7250], there is are only very few product
introductions and there is one ’top product’ that persistently dominates. Fig-
ure 12e contains the curves of the smoothened design dominance (see Eq. 3 in
Subsection 3.6). We have three curves (with different colors for clarity) starting
at the radical innovation punctuations, each indicating the dominance of one
generation of product technology. We see that the curves start low, steeply rise
and then level off when the top product technology starts to dominate. On
the basis of these simulation results, we argue that our simulation model repro-
duces the stylized fact that there is turmoil followed by convergence in product
technology. As far as technology turmoil is concerned we recognize the distinct
features of the era of ferment and the era of incremental change.
Figure 12a contains the curves of the number of firms. The blue dotted curve
is the total number of firms. The purple dashed curve is the number of integrated
firms. The khaki continuous line is the number of system assemblers, while the
green dot-dashed line is the number of input component suppliers. Right after
the radical innovation punctuations at period 0, 3750 and 7250, there is a steep
increase of the total number of agents. With the design dominance -plotted
in Figure 12e- approaching 1, and the technological turmoil almost over (see
the intervals mentioned above), the (total) number of firms steeply drops. We
also see that the firms switch their governance form from vertical integration to
vertical specialization. On the basis of these simulation results, we argue that
our simulation model reproduces the stylized fact that there is a swarm-in of
firms after a radical breakthrough and a shake-out around the moment that one
or a few particular product technologies start(s) to dominate.
Figure 12f contains plots of the smoothened average profit margin of products
on the market, per generation. We see that there is a very steep rise just after
the radical breakthrough, to then decrease and approach zero. We see three
consecutive curves (with different colors for clarity), one for every generation of
product technology. The steep increase is caused by the fact that we use the
smoothened average profit that starts at 0. As explained in Subsection 3.4, the
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Figure 12: Plots of various statistics of an industry evolution with three life-
cycles. A detailed description of the figures and the curves is found in Subsection
4.1.
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price of the first product of a particular generation is equal to the maximum
willingness to pay p∗. Note that the average price for products of a certain
generation is decreasing, while Figure 12c indicates the product performance is
increasing. The temporary increase in profit margin around 4000 is due to a
monopolist raising its price for (inelastic) demand from consumers that are still
consuming an old generation product (see Subsection 3.4). On the basis of these
simulation results, we argue that our simulation model reproduces the stylized
fact that there is profit erosion due to price competition.
There are two figures that are not immediately related to the stylized facts.
Figure 12b contains the curves of the number of firms per business strategy
(entrepreneur, manufacturer). The blue dotted curve is the total number of
firms, the purple dashed curve the number of entrepreneurs, and the khaki
continuous curve the number of manufacturers. We see that endings of the eras
of ferment (around periods 2000 and 5000) coincide with the switching of firms
from the entrepreneurial to the mass-manufacturing business strategy.
Figure 12d contains curves of the capital for each firm. The colors of the curves
differ to be able to distinguish one from the other. For some firms, the capital
increases first and only after some time starts to decrease. Some firms exist over
multiple product life-cycles. Other firms fail to realize a (substantial) market
share and are forced to exit shortly after entry.
The product life-cycles keep on featuring the stylized facts (swarm-in/ shake-
out, technology turmoil/ convergence, and profit erosion) for different, non-
extreme values of imitability and complexity (substitutability). However, the
higher the complexity, the more detrimental technological distance between in-
put and system is, the lower the average product performance becomes. As the
probabilities of being deselected relate to the relative product performances, the
market concentration is lower in case of high than is in case of low complexity.
The revenue differences between firms drops with complexity and there are fewer
big players. Furthermore, the lower imitability, the longer imitation takes, the
more firms with top products appropriate the value of their products. These
firms with top products will thus grow a bigger market share and gain more
capital, and cause a more concentrated industry.
Effects of parameter changes on the stylized product life-cycle
At present, we have tuned the parameters for the costs structure, technology
landscape, demand and pricing modules, and strategy parameters to assure
that the simulation results feature the stylized facts as described above. Neo-
Schumpeterian models lend themselves for treating these parameters as me-
diating variables and to study the effect of these parameters on the industry
evolution. Given the number of parameters in our model, we cannot discuss all
possible variations.
As discussed in detail in Subsection 4.1, there is a relative balance between
the ratio of feasible capabilities (tuned by the landscape parameters), the peri-
odic operation costs, and possible revenue (as tuned by number of customers,
maximum willingness-to-pay, diffusion-substitution rate, and price adjustment
rate). If we change the relative number of peaks in the technology landscape
by changing N , D, this has obvious implications. For instance, increasing N or
D requires longer search, and firms thus incur higher search costs before find-
ing feasible capabilities, and thereby more bankruptcies (and more entries, see
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Subsection 3.6). Simulation studies revealed that the number of consumers and
maximum willingness-to-pay p∗ lengthen the product life-cycle. The underlying
cause arguably is that the total market revenue increases. Lowering the price
poll size increases the volatility in pricing. Lowering the profit margin at which
firms start doing radical research will extend the era of incremental change of
the product life-cycle. Other parameters, like the transaction and periodic op-
erating costs, merely change the slope of the capital curves.
The product life-cycles keep on featuring the stylized facts (swarm-in/ shake-out,
technology turmoil/ convergence, and profit erosion) for different, non-extreme
values of imitability and complexity (substitutability). However, the higher the
complexity, the more detrimental technological distance between input compo-
nent and system is, the lower the average product performance becomes. As
the probability of being deselected relates to the relative product performances,
the market concentration is lower in case of high than is in case of low complex-
ity. The differences in revenue between firms drop with complexity and there
are fewer big players. Furthermore, the lower imitability, the longer imitation
takes, the more firms with top products appropriate the value of their products.
These firms with top products will thus grow a bigger market share and gain
more capital, and cause a more concentrated industry.
4.2 Governance patterns
We report the findings from extensive simulation experiments for four combina-
tions of imitability (low i = 0.025/ high i = 0.125) and complexity (low x = 0/
high x = 8) and the statistical analysis of the governance patterns emerging.
For each of these four combinations, we simulate the industry evolution for
50000 periods, and for 100 different seed values. For each seed value, we take
the governance strategy with the highest (discounted) capital stock at the end
of these 50000 periods and register the governance form in both the eras of
ferment and incremental change. We thus construct a 2 × 2 contingency table
with the governance form in the era of incremental change on the X-axis and
the governance form in the era of ferment on the Y -axis. Figure 13 contains a
2× 2 table with the four scenarios for the particular settings for imitability and
complexity, with the contingency table of the simulation results in each cell of
this table. We first discuss the statistics used and then the simulation outcomes,
their statistical analysis and the interpretation thereof.
Statistics used
To test whether firms prefer one or the other governance form in either one of
the eras (ferment and incremental change), we point out that under the null
hypothesis of no preference, the count data follows a Binomial distribution with
p = 12 . Suppose the top strategy emerging from simulation prefers outsourcing
no times and integration ni times. The probability of this observation (no, ni)
under H0 is equal to
(
n
no
)
pn.
The so-called p-value (a different p than the probability just mentioned) of ob-
serving (no, ni) or a more extreme outcome under the null-hypothesis is defined
as P(B < min{no, ni} |H0) with B ∼ Bin(n,
1
2 ). The p-values are also presented
in Figure 13, where prow (pcol) is the p-value for a preference for one or the
other governance form in the era of ferment (era of incremental change).
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Figure 13: Governance patterns emerging in our simulation for low and high
imitability and low and high complexity (high and low substitutability). Row
(column): type of governance form picked in the era of ferment (incremental
change).
complexity imitability Era McNemar X2
Ferment Incremental change
x = 0 i = 0.025 55% outsources 85% outsources X2 = 26.5
i = 0.125 87% outsources 93% outsources X2 = 3.0
x = 8 i = 0.025 84% integrates 74% outsources X2 = 58.0
i = 0.125 75% integrates 91% outsources X2 = 62.2
Table 2: McNemar statistics on change in vertical governance strategy from the
era of ferment to the era of incremental change for different levels of complexity
and imitability. With one df, the McNemar test rejects H0 (no change) if
X2 > 3.84 (5% significance level).
To test whether the emergence of the dominant design changes the choice of firms
to outsource or integrate, we use McNemar’s chi-square statisticX2 = (n12−n21)
2
n12+n21
for matched-pair homogeneity. McNemar’s non-parametric test based on this
statistic signals whether or not there are significantly many counts in the off-
diagonal cells. The X2 values in Figure 13 indicate whether or not there is a
significant change in preference from outsourcing to integration or vice versa.
With one degree of freedom, the McNemar chi-square statistic X2 for matched-
pair homogeneity leads to rejection of H0 of equality if X
2 > 3.84 (5% signifi-
cance level).
We also use McNemar’s statistic to test whether -within the same era- a certain
change in parameter value also changes the preference for a certain governance
form. We do so by running the simulation with exactly the same parameter
settings and seed value, changing only this one parameter (here, complexity x
or imitability i). Table 3 contains these results.
Statistical findings and interpretation
In Table 2, we see that the dominant pattern is to outsource in the era of incre-
mental change (for occassional recombination and upstream scale economics)
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and to integrate under low substitutability and to outsource under high im-
itability in the era of ferment.
In the era of incremental change, firms are significantly often vertically special-
ized (low pcol values) regardless of imitability or complexity/ substitutability.
In Table 3, we see that complexity decreases the propensity to outsource: if
complexity is higher, incompatibilities with a newly discovered complement is
more likely, so the benefit of being able to switch is lower. Interestingly, im-
itability mediates the effect of increasing complexity. If imitability is low, there
is significantly less outsourcing (more integration) when complexity increases.
The conceptual interpretation is that, given that it takes -in expectation- many
periods to imitate a competing product, the value of an integrated product can
be appropriated. For high imitability, i = 0.125, the integrated product is imi-
tated near instantly, the value is not appropriated by the inventor, so developing
an integrated solution is less attractive, which further discourages integration
(although it is not significant). Moreover, the integrated firm does not enjoy
the benefits of being able to switch to a newly discovered complement (or being
switched to in case of an input supplier). Particularly under low complexity, a
specialized supplier with a top input enjoys scale economies and thereby its cus-
tomers. Conclusively, firms prefer outsourcing in the era of incremental change.
However, there is less outsourcing whenever complexity increases, particularly
when the value of synergistically attuned products can be appropriated more
(i.e. under low imitability).
In the era of ferment, there is no clear preference for either outsourcing or ver-
tical specialization. However, we see that firms vertically integrate more often
with an increase in complexity (also see Table 3). The propensity to outsource
more under low complexity and integrate more under high complexity further
polarizes with imitability. The conceptual explanation is that with an increase in
imitability, appropriability and hence the value of integration decreases. When-
ever complexity is higher, there is more integration to overcome compatibility
issues with arbitrary (new) complements. So, the trade-off of high performance
plus exclusion/ appropriation through integration versus quick recombination
and decentralized search tilts in favor of vertical integration with an increase
in complexity, but this is countered by an increase in imitability as this lowers
appropriability.
We find that costs mediate in the obvious direction. If transaction costs drop,
there is more outsourcing, especially in the era of incremental change. Further-
more, the higher the costs of changing the governance form, the more firms stick
to a single governance form over both eras.
Comparing theoretical predictions with statistical results
Next, we compare our simulation results contained in Table 4 with our hypothe-
ses contained in Table 1.
We see that whenever the effects of imitability and substitutability both in-
dicate to outsource or both indicate to integrate (i.e. the two on-diagonal cases),
our simulation results confirm that this effect occurs during the era of ferment.
However, whenever integration is predicted (the case with low substitutability
and low imitability), that the tendency to integrate is dominated by outsourcing
during the era of incremental change. We interpret this as that favorable cost
differentials of outsourcing to a supplier with a top input dominate the -as we
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value fixed change in value Era for which test is conducted
parameter controlled parameter
Ferment Incremental change
x = 0 i = 0.025→ 0.125 more outsourcing no sign. diff.
X2 ≈ 17.0 X2 ≈ 0.529
x = 8 i = 0.025→ 0.125 no sign. diff. more outsourcing
X2 ≈ 3.60 X2 ≈ 7.26
i = 0.025 x = 0→ 8 more integration more integration
X2 ≈ 4.57 X2 ≈ 11.1
i = 0.125 x = 0→ 8 more integration no sign. diff.
X2 ≈ 46.0 X2 ≈ 2.91
Table 3: McNemar statistics on change in vertical governance strategy upon a
change in capability regime parameter value. With one df, the McNemar test
rejects H0 (governance forms are not affected by the change in regime property)
if X2 > 3.84 (5% significance level).
Substitutability
Low (x = 8) High (x = 0)
Im
it
a
b
il
it
y Low Integration for attuning and Indifference in era of ferment
(i = 0.025) exclusion followed by followed by outsourcing
outsourcing
High Integration for attuning, Outsourcing in both eras
(i = 0.125) followed by outsourcing
Table 4: Emerging governance forms in both eras subject to imitability and
substitutability.
already argued in Section 2.2- relatively weak factors in favor of integration.
Whenever the effects of imitability and substitutability are opposites (i.e. the
two off-diagonal cases), there is theoretical ambiguity on the governance form.
We see that, in the era of incremental change, decentralized search and favor-
able cost differentials dominate benefits of integration. Under high imitability
and low substitutability, we see that in the era of ferment, under technological
turmoil, there is no significant preference for either integration or specialization.
Under our parameter choices, decentralized search by specialization gives about
as much competitive advantages as does appropriation through integration. As
firms are entrepreneurs with flexible job shops, there is no cost advantage of
outsourcing.
Reproducibility and robustness checks
An extensive number of runs for different seed values revealed that the results
are reproduced for the parameter settings given in Appendix 6. In Subsection
4.1, we explained that the number of feasible capabilities on the landscape, the
periodic operation costs, and possible revenue are fine-tuned to one another.
Disruptive change to parameters in either one of these modules will generally
cause more variance in the simulation outcomes and less significant results.
The explanation of this increase in variance is sought in the fact that disruptive
change in parameters weakens the discriminative power of the selection in the
model. If costs increase or payoff decreases disruptively, firms generally live
shorter, have only relatively few search steps, such that their survival highly
depends on ’serendipitous’ findings of capabilities. If costs decrease or payoff
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increases significantly, there are relatively few firms that go bankrupt, industries
get a low clockspeed, and there are only few ’selective’ technology punctuations
(emergences of a dominant design and radical breakthroughs). In both cases,
there is considerable ’uncertainty’ in which strategy survives, and thereby con-
siderable variation in the emerging governance strategy.
The values for the parameters of these modules are chosen such that the sim-
ulated economy does not suffer weak selective power due to the longevity of
the industry, nor suffers weak discriminative power due to mostly accidental
survival. Experimentation runs have revealed that incremental change to pa-
rameters has only moderate effects on the simulation outcomes.
However, given the parameter values for these modules, there still are param-
eters that mostly affect the costs and chances of finding top-fit capabilities
depending on the governance strategy. The most obvious one is the transaction
cost when buying components upstream. Simulation studies showed a dominant
effect of transaction costs: if transaction costs drop, there is more outsourcing,
especially in the era of incremental change. Other obvious ones are the costs
of vertical integration and outsourcing. The higher these costs, the more firms
stick to a single governance form over both eras.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we studied the governance form to be preferred in the different
stages of the product life-cycle. In particular, we claimed that there is no uni-
versal governance pattern over the life-cycle, but rather that this governance
pattern depends on imitability and substitutability of the capabilities in the in-
dustry. We formulated predictions on how imitability and substitutability affect
the propensity to integrate or specialize during each of the eras of technological
change. We provided a neo-Schumpeterian simulation model that reproduces
an industry evolution consisting of consecutive product life-cycles. This model
reproduces the usual evolutionary economic stylized facts robustly. We used
our neo-Schumpeterian model to study the evolutionary emerging governance
strategies of agents (and thereby governance patterns of the industry) under
different settings for the independent variables imitability and complexity (in-
verse of substitutability).
The simulation results confirm our claims that there is no uniform governance
pattern and that the evolutionary preferred governance forms strongly depends
on imitability and substitutability in interaction. In the era of incremental
change, firms prefer vertical specialization, particularly when substitutability
is high. The higher substitutability (lower complexity), the more valuable is
flexibility to recombine with new complementary capabilities and the higher
(potential) upstream scale advantages. Higher imitability causes lower appro-
priability so further discourages integration. Transaction costs have a dominant
mediating effect on the vertical governance form.
In the era of ferment, governance preferences are more ambiguous. Conse-
quently, under high imitability, there is limited appropriability, and firms do not
vertically integrate to develop products with superior performance. Nonetheless,
firms do then not automatically vertically specialize. Under higher complexity,
there generally is more incompatibility such that the combinatorial advantage
of vertical specialization decreases, hence firms are more likely to vertically in-
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tegrate.
The major implication of the findings in this chapter is that governance studies
should take into account capability properties, notably substitutability and im-
itability in interaction. We recommend follow-up empirical research on the role
of capability properties in governance decisions, particularly during the era of
ferment.
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Appendices
6 Parameter settings
Technology landscape parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings to specify the number of capabili-
ties, the number of feasible capability distribution, and the distribution of the
capability performances.
Number of abilities per capability N 6
Number of types of abilities/ skills/ techniques D 5
Number of feasible capabilities per landscape C 100
Capability performance distribution (scale, tail) α, β 3.0, 0.5
Strategy parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings for the decisions that firms take to
either explore, imitate or conduct radical innovation
Imitation performance threshold (entr./ manuf.) 1.05, 1.15
Min. improvement of top product required (entr./ manuf.) 0.8, 0.9
Required minimum profit threshold to enter (entr./ manuf.) 0.15, 0.05
Maximum design dominance entry (entr./ manuf.) 0.8, 0.8
Radical search profit margin threshold 0.02
Radical search dominant design threshold 0.90
Business strategy threshold (margin) 0.80(±0.06)
Strategy imitation failure rate 0.05
Demand/ diffusion-substitution parameter settings
We have the following parameter setting to specify the market demand and its
development due to substitution-diffusion.
Market size in number of customers M 4000
Number of customers upon product launch 150
Product panel size Q 4
Discrete Choice Choosiness γ 600
Replacement rate r 0.05
Standard Deviation Rogerian adoption willingness µ 30
Maximum willingness-to-pay p∗ 150
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Pricing parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings to specify the polling that firms con-
duct to adjust their price.
Poll panel size B 100
Investigated price change 0.00125
Capital/ costs parameter settings
We have to the following parameter settings to specify the capital the firms
have when entering, and the costs that firms make periodically and for certain
actions.
Unit production costs (entr./ manuf.) 5, 2
Transaction costs per supplier relation 300
Periodic operation costs per tier(entr./ manuf.) 400, 850
Capital starting level 800k
Cost of production change (entr./ manuf.) 0,−50k
Cost of radical search, imitation of next generation −400k,−200k
Cost of governance change (insourcing, outsourcing) −50k, 0
Parameter settings for macro-economic variables
We have the following parameter settings in the initialization of and (plotted)
macro-level metrics during the simulation of an industry.
Initial population size A 4
Discounting/ expon. smoothing rate capital 0.001
Exponential smoothing rate design dominance 0.003
Exponential smoothing rate profit margin, market concentration 0.01
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